

COMMITTEE GUIDE

Security Council

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

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PRESIDENT'S WELCOME LETTER

"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." -
Aristotle

Dear delegates,

It is truly an honor to welcome you to the eleventh edition of the model of the United Nations of Gimnasio la Colina (GLCMUN) and its Security Council (SC). We are your presidents, Juan Felipe López from Liceo los Alpes and Gabriela Zuñiga Swann from Gimnasio la Colina and we are looking forward to guide you throughout this academic simulation of the UN so you have an enriching and fulfilling experience of learning, connecting, adapting and enjoying.

During our path in MUN, we have encountered countless challenges as both delegates and chairs, yet we have also learned invaluable skills and discovered a new passion that has brought us into this presidency. Our goal is to provide you with an experience that leaves a mark in your personal and academic growth. For us, the Security Council is more than just seeking peace and security, it is about acknowledging the different perspectives of each culture or State, understanding why their political views differ and getting to a resolution that takes all of that in mind.

Lastly, remember that we are here to support you, don't be afraid to ask anything or to talk with us about anything regarding the committee, your questions are building a more complex and enriching debate for you and for us and help you overcome any doubt you may have in yourself. We have high expectations; we trust in you and you should too.

Sincerely,

Juan Felipe Lopez

Juan Felipe López | President Security Council

Gabriela Zuñiga

Gabriela Zuñiga | President Security Council

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

HISTORY

The Security Council was established after World War II with the purpose of preventing future conflicts and ensuring international stability. The Charter of the United Nations, signed on June 26, 1945, entered into force on October 24 of the same year, formalizing the creation of the Council. Initially, it was composed of 11 members: five permanent and six non-permanent. In 1965, an amendment to the Charter increased the number of non-permanent members to ten, resulting in the current 15 members (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2025).

MISSION AND VISION

The Security Council's vision is of a world in which international peace and security are maintained effectively and sustainably. Its mission, according to the Charter of the United Nations, includes:

- Maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
- Investigating any dispute or situation that might create international friction.
- Recommend methods for adjusting such disputes or terms of settlement.
- Develop plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments.
- Determine whether there is a threat to the peace or an act of aggression and recommend what measures should be taken.
- Urge members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression.
- Take military action against an aggressor.
- Recommend the admission of new members.
- Exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas."
- Recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, elect the judges of the International Court of Justice (Security Council, n.d.).

STRUCTURE

The Security Council is composed of 15 members: five permanent and ten non-permanent. The permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

These members have veto power, meaning that any substantive resolution or decision can be blocked by a negative vote from any one of them (Security Council, n.d.).

The ten non-permanent members are elected by the UN General Assembly for two-year terms, with equitable geographical distribution: five from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, and two from Western Europe and other states. Each member has a representative at all times at UN Headquarters in New York to ensure that the Council can meet whenever necessary (Security Council, n.d.).

REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

The functions and powers of the Security Council are outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, specifically in Articles 23 to 32. According to Article 24, the members of the UN confer upon the Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, acting on their behalf in carrying out these functions (United Nations, n.d.).

CHALLENGES AND REFORMS

Over the years, the Security Council has faced criticism related to its representativeness and effectiveness. The current composition reflects the geopolitical reality of 1945, which has led to calls for reforming the Council and making it more representative of global dynamics, arguing that permanent membership would better reflect the current balance of power (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2025).

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TOPIC 1:

Threat to Regional Peace due to the Caribbean Diplomatic Crisis

CONTEXT

The Caribbean Diplomatic Crisis is a threat to peace and security that largely originated from the political, economic and military friction existing between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and United States of America. The Caribbean known as a relatively stable region but very recent events military engagements, economic sanctions and diplomatic exchanges have allowed the international community to raise certain concerns about the risk of an escalation or destabilisation.



Figure 1: The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (Wikipedia, 2025).

The relationship between Venezuela and the United States was cooperative throughout much of the twentieth century, especially due to Venezuela's role as a major oil supplier and its alignment with U.S. strategic interest during the Cold War. The problem comes when this relationship deteriorates significantly after the election of President Hugo Chavez in 1998. Chavez promoted a policy which entered on anti imperialism, having regional autonomy and a resistance to U.S. influence in Latin America. He rejected the U.S backed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and decided to promote instead the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Corrales & Penfold, 2015)

Under Chavez, and later on Nicolas Maduro's command, Venezuela strengthened ties with countries such as Cuba, Russia, China, and Iran, while openly criticizing U.S. foreign policy. All of these decisions added up to create a deep ideological division which then transferred into bilateral disagreements into a broader geopolitical confrontation (Ellner, 2019)



Figure 2: Hugo Chávez winning the 1998 elections (BBC, 2019),

During the mid 2010s, as Venezuela entered a political and economic crisis due to the combination of hyperinflation, food shortages, mass migration and institutional breakdown, the tensions escalated even more. With the help of some allies, the United States decided on economic and individual sanctions, all of this targeting Venezuela's government officials and the oil company owned by the state, PDVSA. "Restoring democracy in Venezuela and addressing the human rights violations," were stated as justification (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2023).

Venezuela has been refuting that all these sanctions are collective punishment and economic warfare that further aggravate the humanitarian crisis and violate international law as well. UN Special Rapporteurs sounds alarm as sanctions continue to pile more pressure on civilians and destroy the economy (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2020).

The US intensified its navy and air presence in the Caribbean. U.S. officials presented these deployments as lawful efforts to fight crime and drug trafficking, but Venezuela saw them only as provocative acts and direct challenges to its sovereignty (Reuters, 2020).

The Caribbean Sea is of great strategic value, as a busy trade route and an important energy corridor, and military activity there is highly sensitive. Venezuela has strongly denounced the U.S. for allegedly using counter-narcotics as a cover for intelligence activities and possible military aggression (Government of Venezuela, 2021). These allegations resonated as well with certain regional elements afraid that unilateral military action threatened to unsettle the wider Caribbean.

International Law disputes

The varied interpretations of how to properly apply international law are a core dispute in the diplomatic crisis. On one hand, international law has been used by the United States to justify its recent security operations in the Caribbean region.

The US argues the right to self defence is protected under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and that their military actions are of the best interest, the interest of longlasting peace. On the other hand, Venezuela looks for protection in international law. The South American country claims that Article 2(4) of the charter clearly prohibits the threat or use of force against the political independence and territorial integrity of any state (United Nations, 1945).

The issue has also been debated in the United Nations Security Council, and its members are deeply divided because of it. Some states stress the important principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes; others restate that the need to combat transnational crime and regional security threats must come first. (United Nations Security Council, 2023)

Both Latin America and the Caribbean have reacted differently to the diplomatic crisis. The Caribbean Community, CARICOM, has consistently said that countries in the Caribbean should show restraint and engage in dialogue. They also wished to keep the Caribbean as a "zone of peace." CARICOM has voiced concerns over the militarisation of the region, leading to instability within itself and drawing smaller Caribbean nations into competitions between the larger powers (CARICOM Secretariat, 2021). Similarly, CELAC has encouraged diplomatic solutions and has stated that military intervention by outside nations would not be acceptable within the Latin America community. The principles promoted by CARICOM and CELAC regarding military intervention reflect the broader commitment to non-intervention that this region has displayed as a result of the historical impact of foreign intervention during the 20th century (Serbin, 2020).

As military deployments grow, the military exercises conducted by external powers have escalated, and the number of diplomatic negotiations increased. In recent years, an environment that is increasingly volatile and susceptible to miscalculations and miscommunication can be leading to war. The implications of a conflict escalating into an armed confrontation would have severe negative consequences on trade, energy, and the civilian populations of the region. Additionally, the presence of external powers creates additional layers of complexity to the conflict and provide a dynamic for further complications of conflict resolution (International Crisis Group, 2023).

The U.S. Military Buildup in the Caribbean
U.S. military presence as of December 1, 2025



Figure 3: US military buildup in the Caribbean (Council of Foreign Relations, 2025).

Moreover, the current internal instability in Venezuela is creating an environment where people have begun to migrate in large numbers to other countries in the Caribbean, adding to the strains on the governments and humanitarian resources of many neighbouring countries. This migration crisis exposes how the diplomatic conflict extends beyond bilateral relations and directly affects regional peace and security (UNHCR, 2023).

For the United Nations Security Council, the Caribbean diplomatic crisis presents a complex number of issues related to sovereignty, to international law, and to humanitarian issues, as well as issues related to the prevention of armed conflict. In view of the historic threat to regional peace which has recently escalated, a unique responsibility outlined in the UN Charter arises to protect international peace and security, and to promote peaceful resolution of disputes between states. Therefore, the United Nations Security Council must remain the most significant forum for furthering dialogue about the ongoing tensions in this particular region.

The history of the specific case of the United States and Venezuela diplomatic dispute enlightens the perspectives which should guide the drafting of possible legal and balanced responses to both the short-term security concerns and the long-term efforts to achieve peace and stability in the region.

CURRENT SITUATION

The Caribbean diplomatic crisis comes from the rising tensions provoked by the military strikes from the United States of America against Venezuelan vessels and the subsequent capture of its head of state, Nicolas Maduro. The U.S.A. carried out a military operation in the Caribbean, justified on "international security" that is still affecting regional peace, diplomatic relations within Caribbean countries and escalated into a wider regional impact that has the possibility to escalate.

Since January 28, 2025, the U.S. Navy has hinted at a new operation named Southern Spear. It would deploy vehicles and forces with top of the line technology including a mix of robotic and autonomous systems (RAS), which is intended to monitor illicit traffic on maritime regions to strengthen sovereignty and global cooperation in the Southern Command area of responsibility, which includes more than thirty Latin American and Caribbean countries.

The operation continued to take shape, as Washington asserts on what it claims is a renewed policy in the fight against drug trafficking, while accusing the Venezuelan government of being linked to the Cartel of the Suns (considered a terrorist organization by the U.S.). Caracas denies these accusations (France 24, 2025)



Figure 4: Tren de Aragua activities in the Americas (Small Wars Journals, 2025).

On September 3 of the same year, the United States activated Operation Southern Spear and made the first direct attack against a vessel in the Caribbean. According to CNN (2025), President Trump said he gave the order to the armed forces to combat drug trafficking by the criminal group Tren de Aragua that, as seen in *figure 4*, operates throughout the Americas. It is important to clarify that CNN

reported that there is no clear evidence from the Department of Defense that the men in the boat were related to drug trafficking.

Back in August, the president of the United States ordered three warships to the Southern Caribbean Navy area to “intercept vessels suspected of transporting drugs leaving Venezuela.” (BBC, 2025) and started to deploy the 10,000 troops that are currently in the Caribbean along with aircraft and ships (the largest deployment in the region for decades). Everything with a “counterdrugs” and “counterterrorism” purpose, as according to the U.S. the cartels represent a major threat to their interests and national security, which is increasing tensions with Venezuela. (New York Times, 2025)



Figure 5: Strikes against vessels in the Caribbean (The Guardian, n.d.).

From these first attacks, until December 5 of the present year, many attacks on various boats have taken place, through the Caribbean Sea and even right in front of Venezuela's coast. In some vessels, in addition to Venezuelans, some Colombians and Ecuadorians have been captured as Trump's “armed conflict with drug cartels” continues. In total, 23 boats have been destroyed and 87 people have died during that time period. (CNN, 2025)

Pete Hegseth, U.S. secretary of defense, justified these actions by claiming that they were transporting narcotics to U.S. territory and "The United States armed forces will treat these organizations as the terrorists they are: they will be hunted down and killed, just like Al Qaeda." (2025) At the moment, these words, rather than warning any cartel, seemed to show an explicit and concerning parallelism between military intervention by the U.S. in the Caribbean and the one in the Middle East, especially the one in Afghanistan, an intervention that, according to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan left 111,000 civilians dead or injured.

Meanwhile, Venezuela's government considers that the White House's intention is to change the country's regime and challenge its sovereignty. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in 2025, Venezuela requested a UN Security Council emergency session focused on the military actions conducted by the U.S. through a letter to Russia's United Nations ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia. Who has accused Trump of wanting to remove Maduro from power and being a menace to regional and international stability since October 2025.

Colombia, one of Venezuela's border countries, has recognized that even though Maduro is part of a dictatorship, his government is not linked to illegal drug-trafficking. President Gustavo Petro fully condemned the military actions, as he is "against genocides and assassinations of power in the Caribbean" and thinks they are not driven by the intention of protecting Venezuela's democracy or fighting narco trafficking, but rather to take its oil reserves. He even compared the U.S. actions to imperialism as it seeks to control the region (Cakmak, 2025).

Later, the President of the US said that "Colombia is producing a lot of drugs, a lot of — they have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into the United States. So, he'd better wise up, or he'll be next. He'll be next, too." (Trump, 2025) This statement suggests that the White House's will is to keep expanding its military influence in the region through a solely hard power strategy. This raises concerns about the normalization of unilateral interventions in the region, beginning with Colombia, a country whose current head of state has had multiple disagreements with Trump's administration.

Meanwhile, tensions kept increasing as what is referred to by BBC news as Washington's pressure campaign against Nicolas Maduro's government escalated. On December 10th, 2025 the United States seized a Venezuelan oil tanker, described by Trump as the largest one they have ever seized.

Venezuela accused Washington of wanting to steal its resources and described the seizure as “international piracy.” (BBC, 2025) These accusations have gained traction and reinforced Caracas’s narrative that U.S. actions constitute a direct threat to its sovereignty because of the U.S. president’s response when asked what the country was going to do with the oil that was valued at 80 million dollars (5% of Venezuela’s import needs) by The Wall Street Journal Reports , he said: “We keep it, I guess... I assume we're going to keep the oil.” (Trump, 2025).



Figure 6: Alleged footage of the U.S. seizure of the oil ship released by the government (BBC News, 2026).

At a regional level, as seen in Figure 7, Washington has many military forces across the Caribbean islands’ territory. Additionally, many nations are providing logistical support to the U.S., like the Dominican Republic, that according to BBC news in 2025, is explicitly providing vigilance to Southern Spear and has signed an agreement to allow Washington to use Dominican airports for military purposes. This is because, for its president "This fight against drug trafficking is a priority for his administration [Trump's], as it is a threat that affects national and regional stability." (Abinader, 2025).

In the islands Aruba, Curacao and Bonaire, owned by the Netherlands, there are 2 American bases of operation that have the official mission to detect and monitor possible drug-trafficking activity through sea and air. This has concerned military experts, since Caracas may perceive the logistical support as hostile and intervene in these other Caribbean islands, starting a major conflict within the region (BBC, 2025).




Figure 7: Where the U.S. is building up military force in the caribbean (New York Times, 2025).

Just 11 kilometers away from the Venezuelan coastline, there are the islands Trinidad and Tobago, which for years have been one of the countries most affected by the Venezuelan migrants crisis and the activities of different criminal groups. The government has shown a position in favor of the U.S. actions, having received US warships and facilitated US special forces training, but clarifying that unless Maduro attacks them first, they would not launch the U.S. offensive operations from their territory.

Also, in the Caribbean there is an island that is U.S. territory that is being used to house military personnel and provide logistical support to operations like Southern Spear: Puerto Rico. There, an old military base used during the Cold War, and closed in 2004, is being reactivated, modernized and expanded to allow the operation of larger equipment (BBC, 2025) and is likely to be utilized to continue with the American intervention in the Caribbean.

In Cuba, a loyal supporter of Maduro's regime, the foreign ministry followed Maduro's take and described the attacks as "an act of piracy and maritime terrorism" and a violation of international laws and agreements. He also added that the conflict deeply hurts the Caribbean nation and its people, as Washington increases the intensity of its control and political pressure policy, something that may be detrimental to social and economic development. Especially because, according to The Guardian (2025) Cuba has traded medical experts and security personnel in return for imports of Venezuela's oil that have been intercepted through December.

On the other side of the globe, China, which in December 5 said it was working with both parties to prevent escalation in the Caribbean, now is also condemning the U.S. actions after the large seizure of oil. China accused the U.S. of "blatant theft and international piracy against sovereign nations like Venezuela", which is consistent taking into account that, despite sanctions made by Washington, China is the main importer of Venezuelan oil (around 80% of Venezuela's imported oil goes to China.) The overall situation is a blow to Beijing, as the United States seeks to regain the political control in the Caribbean and Latin America that had been wrested from it by the Chinese (Modern diplomacy, 2025).

The foreign minister of Russia, a country that is also a client for Venezuela's oil, has also shown discontent about the military actions, demanding a further explanation of these acts (The Hills, 2025). However, according to a report by BBC in 2025, neither China nor Russia are willing to provide direct military support to Venezuela by December, which is showcased by their simple diplomatic condemnation rather than framing the U.S. acts as a violation of sovereignty, like Colombia and Cuba have done.

The United Kingdom, another Veto Power, had a position against Maduro's regime, but is not involved in the U.S. intervention, as its desire is "to achieve a peaceful negotiated transition in Venezuela which ensures that the will of all Venezuelans is respected" (U.K. Parliament, 2025).

However, while tensions were rising, the unprecedented happened.

"Last night and early today, at my direction, the United States armed forces conducted an extraordinary military operation in the capital of Venezuela. ... It was an operation against a heavily fortified military fortress in the heart of Caracas to bring outlaw dictator Nicolás Maduro to justice," (Trump, 2026).

On January 3rd, 2026, the conflict went from a concerning regional militarization with counted attacks to a full complex military operation that took the head of state of Venezuela, changed the history of that country forever and flipped over regional diplomacy. For months prior to the "Operation Absolute Resolve" U.S. spies have been watching Nicolas Maduro's daily routine to properly plan the capture. The day of the operation, the U.S. military entered Caracas with organized chaos through helicopters, drones and strikes that damaged the Fuerte Tunia military base, which created distraction, allowing them to enter Maduro's residency by 2:01 am and shortly after that, capture the Venezuelan leader and his wife Cilia Flores. (CNN, 2026)

Later on the day of the attack, the United State's department of War (2026) stated that "With Maduro now out of power, Trump said the U.S. will oversee Venezuela until a safe transition to a legitimate replacement for the deposed strongman can be identified."

The time of transition remained uncertain, but Trump assured that they want to make Venezuela produce more economically and give the people a good quality of life that allows the Venezuelan immigrants currently in the U.S. return to their home country.

In the meantime, Delcy Rodriguez (former Maduro's vice president) seems to be cooperating with American interests so she's working along Secretary of State Marco Rubio to help the U.S. government "run the country" and do what they think is necessary to "make Venezuela great again."

Maduro and his wife were transferred to New York City to face charges for narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. The U.S. congress (2026), who was not




Figure 8: Nicolas Maduro after the capture (BBC News, 2026).



Figure 9: Fuerte Tiuna, Venezuela's largest military complex, was hit by the U.S. strikes early on Saturday morning (BBC News, 2026).

priorly warned of the operation, informed through an official report that they support a transition to democracy in Venezuela, but condemn Trump’s attacks without their permission, considering to make a “legislation to authorize or prohibit future military action or related funds for military operations in Venezuela.”

priorly warned of the operation, informed through an official report that they support a transition to democracy in Venezuela, but condemn Trump’s attacks without their permission, considering to make a “legislation to authorize or prohibit future military action or related funds for military operations in Venezuela.”

On the other side, many other heads of states are against the military actions. China said it was "deeply shocked and strongly condemns" the use of force against a sovereign country and its president, Russia said that it was an "act of armed aggression". Lula Da Silva,

Brazil’s president said that "attacking countries in flagrant violation of international law is the first step toward a world of violence, chaos, and instability," while other latin american leaders such as Gustavo Petro and Gabriel Boric have also called out the “assault on the sovereignty (Venezuela’s)” (BBC, 2026).

Them, along with policy makers and international law scholars, have pointed out the violations to the UN Charter, specifically Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” (UN Charter, 1945). This means that no nation can use military weapons in another country’s territory, as the U.S. has been doing since September 2025 in Venezuela.

The only exceptions to this rule are: when the Security Council authorizes the attack or when a member of the United Nations has been significantly attacked by another state; neither of these situations have been the case.



Figure 10: The Venezuelan Diaspora Celebrates the Capture of Maduro (The Atlantic, 2026).

This is when the largely debated problem appears, whether a violation of sovereignty and international law can be justified by “helping” the people of a country that has been in a humanitarian and political crisis caused by an authoritarian and dishonest government, which caused an international migration crisis, especially over the Americas.

Here is when another issue must be discussed: What are the United State’s actual intentions with Venezuela? First, Trump assures that the U.S. will govern Venezuela until a “safe transition” is done. Also, it is important to understand all of these from the frame of the recently published National Security Strategy that includes the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine ” described by Donald Trump (2026) as a plan that will ensure that "American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never again be questioned." The document itself states that The United States must have control over the Western Hemisphere as a condition their security and prosperity, a condition that allows them “to assert ourselves (The U.S.) with confidence wherever and whenever we need to in the region” (Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 2026).



Figure 11: Monroe Doctrine Caricature (BBC News, 2025).

This means that the U.S. is explicitly open to using force strategies to establish control over the region, which includes the Caribbean countries. Will Freeman, researcher in Latin American Studies at the influential US think tank, Council on Foreign Relations described this doctrine to BBC (2026) as a "kind of ideological justification for US intervention or a hardline approach in the region, which focuses explicitly on immigration." The doctrine mostly focuses on addressing the complex and multinational narco-traffic and immigration issues that exist in Latin and Caribbean America and affect countries all the way to the north.

Regarding specifically the current plan of Trump’s administration for Venezuela and its resources, they have promised to unleash Venezuela's oil, while indefinitely controlling its sale. The plan is to open the market, mostly for U.S. companies and restore the Venezuelan oil industry to its peak from the 90s, while the White House supervises (Buschschlüter, 2026).

Meanwhile, the Caribbean nations don't overlook this country as just a political dilemma, but as a pressing moment of political uncertainty, fear and regional fracture. CARICOM, a regional intergovernmental organization between some Caribbean countries, has approved Trump's intervention with the pretext of addressing transnational crime. Trinidad y Tobago kept supporting the military actions, allowing the U.S. equipment to transit on its territory for Maduro's capture logistics. (Malik, 2026) The Cuban government keeps loyal to Maduro and denounced "state terrorism" because of his capture, which left the casualties of many Cuban soldiers. Also, Donald Trump stopped oil trade with Cuba and threatened them with a "change of regime" unless they make an agreement to align its

its government to the U.S. doctrine, while using the U.S. military base Guantanamo in Cuba to support "Operation Absolute Resolve" as shown in Figure 12 (Le Monde, 2026). This is especially intimidating to Cuba and its allies such as China and Russia, because they lost control over the oil reserves of Venezuela and the economical benefit that comes with it after the end of the socialist aligned approach of Maduro's administration.

This situation, in addition to other menaces to other nearby territories in Latin America and the Caribbean suggest that the dispute for the region's control will keep building up, urging action from the United Nations and the Security Council to maintain regional stability, preserve global diplomacy and prevent major escalation.



Figure 12: Maduro's journey from Venezuela to the U.S (BBC, 2026).

KEY POINTS OF THE DEBATE

- The effects of the U.S. military intervention on the diplomatic relations between Caribbean countries.
- Whether Operation Southern Spear is a legitimate counter narcotics and self protection mission for a violation of international law.
- The tension between the need to address transnational criminal groups/ authoritarian governments and maintaining a country's sovereignty.
- The risk of the Caribbean turning into a broader conflict zone as a result of the U.S. intervention.
- Possible (positive/negative) consequences of the intervention for civilians.
- Discuss if the military strategies enhance the security of the Americas or escalate regional violence.
- The effects of the new U.S. controlled oil market for Venezuela's economy and their economical allies.
- The future of Venezuela's people and government.

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. Would your delegation support the U.S. military intervention? Which legal framework can be used to condemn/justify the use of force?
2. Is your delegation affected directly or indirectly by the Cartel de los Soles or Tren de Aragua criminal groups actions?
3. Your delegation considers that Maduro's government is linked to either of these cartels?
4. Is Maduro's regime recognized or supported by your delegation's government? Which gubernamental actions showcase it?
5. May the actions of the United States be condemned as a violation to any of the Security Council or UN Charter articles?
6. What role can your delegation take in the prevention of major escalation in the conflict?
7. What would your delegations take on solving political crises like Venezuela's?
8. How can the Security Council act effectively taking into account the involvement of a Veto Power in the conflict?
9. To what extent can this conflict be driven by strategic regional power, rather than international security?

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Figure 2: Chávez obtuvo un apoyo masivo en las elecciones de 1998. (2018). [Online Image]. In BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46463299>

Figure 3: Mapping the U.S. Military Buildup Near Venezuela. (2025). [Online Image]. In Council of Foreign Relations . <https://www.cfr.org/articles/mapping-us-military-buildup-near-venezuela>

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Figure 5: US strikes against boats in Caribbean “disregard international law”, French minister says. (n.d.). [Online Image]. In The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/12/us-strikes-against-boats-in-caribbean-disregard-international-law-french-minister-says>

Figure 6: Alleged footage of the U.S. seizure of the oil ship released by the government . (2025). [Online Image]. In BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyp7rkkgvdo>

Figure 7: Where the U.S. is building military force in the Caribbean . (2025). [Online Image]. In New York Times . <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/17/us/politics/trump-caribbean-venezuela-us-military-maps.html>

Figure 8: Trump: US intends to “run” Venezuela, after the capture of President Nicolas Maduro. (2026). [Online Image]. In BBC News. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w172zssht76xdjff>

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Figure 10: Photos: The Venezuelan Diaspora Celebrates the Capture of Maduro. (2026). [Online Image]. In The Atlantic . <https://www.theatlantic.com/photography/2026/01/photos-venezuelan-diaspora-celebrates-capture-maduro/685496/>

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TOPIC 2:

Addressing the destabilizing role of the African Corps Activities in African Security and its Implications for International Peace

CONTEXT

The current effects of Russia's Africa Corps and their role in the region's security takes their origin from the complex and unstable history of sub-saharan Africa, which has made them vulnerable to insurgency nowadays.

"We prefer to be poor in freedom than rich in slavery" (Sékou, 1956.) In the 60s, there was a wave of independence movements in Africa, especially in French colonies. After various attempts from France to avoid the region's independence, pressures from the U.S. obligated them to let go of their colonies. Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Senegal and The Republic of Congo gained full independence in the early 60 's (France 24, 2020).



Figure 1: "Miss Independence" a symbol of the right to self-determination in Nigeria (France 24, 2020).

However, after independence France didn't dismantle their influence and intervened with a neocolonial model, deploying troops to support and empower the French-influenced elites (de Currea-Lugo, 2013). This model prioritized the benefits for the mainland, and failed to remain relevant or perpetuate development, therefore, the newly independent states inherited weak institutions and limited administration capacities, which would then contribute to the recurring instability of the Sahel.

Then, many of the new African countries experienced political turbulence, with coups d'état and establishments of authoritarian governments. In the Sahel and West Africa, these regimes often faced economic difficulties, ethnic fragmentation and limited power in their territories.

During this period of instability in the middle of the Cold War, both the USSR and the United States competed for influence in the territory.

Particularly, the soviets provided military assistance and ideological support for African government's "liberation movements" against those who once oppressed them. In the case of Mali, France's withdrawal of its social and economic support, led the nation to seek refuge in Soviet aid and adopt their model of socialism.

But, after various governments and coups across the Sahel and West Africa, it was not possible to consolidate strong nation-states, with corruption scandals, electoral manipulation, and ineffective service delivery damaging public trust in civilian governments being the rule for the region's countries. Especially since superpower involvement often reinforced militarized politics and contributed to cycles of coups and fragile governance (Abdallah, 2025).

The early 2000s were marked by a shift on regional security, as armed extreme Islamists groups expanded across the Sahel. Taking advantage of the regional fragmentation, groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslim (JNIM), spread across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, looking to gain territory and recruits. These groups conducted attacks towards civilians, infrastructure and military, which further contributed to destabilize the region and perpetuate mass violence in the area (Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores, 2026).



Figure 2: Jihadists groups in Mali (El País, 2012).

In 2012, the jihadists groups gained significantly more power, controlling important cities such as Gao and Timbuktu, establishing thresholds and expanding across the Sahel and displacing entire populations. Then, at Mali's government request for aid in the fight for security France launched "Operation Serval" and the UN established a Multidimensional integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINNUSMA) (UN Security Council, 2013).

These operations successfully temporarily retook some key cities and supported political stabilization. However, France's "Operation Serval" was later replaced with "Operation Barkhane", an open counterterrorism mission across all the Sahel, that despite some tactical success, failed to contain violence and jihadists groups from expanding into more territories. Big attacks continued in Mali and Burkina Faso, in 2015 the hotels Radisson Blu and L'Etule du Sud in Ivory Coast were targeted by jihadists, showcasing the lack of an actual change.

This, in addition to the long standing resentment from the colonial times, made the population frustrated over the foreign military presence of the Western powers, which showed little to no improvement in their stability (Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores, 2026).

Other African countries such as Chad, Niger, and Nigeria were affected across those years by the jihadist group Boko Haram, establishing control over their sovereign territories. The group was formed in 2002, but after being hiding for 2 years from the Nigerian forces that, in 2009 combated and killed many jihadists, including Boko Haram's leader, gained traction after resurfacing in 2011.

During this time, the group abducted 276 Nigerian girls and launched aggressive attacks in Abuja, Nigeria, including suicide bombs on police and UN Headquarters. (Yusuf, 2026) This showed, once again, the inefficiency of all previous international aid responses in the area.

Number of terrorist attacks, 2015

Number of terrorist attacks.




Figure 3: Number of terrorist attacks in 2015 (Our World in Data, 2023).

In the middle of the 2010's decade, insecurity in the Sahel because of terrorism remained alarming and persistent, as shown in **figure 3**, this region had a large amount of terrorist attacks, prominently, Nigeria had 641 and Mali had 121 attacks in 2015, according to Our World in Data (2023). Here, is where the governments from countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR),

Mali and Sudan started to look up for Russian military assistance in order to contain the many rebel alliances (Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, 2020.) This marked the beginning of Russian involvement in Africa's conflicts, a significant juncture in African security that later expanded their military influence.

CURRENT SITUATION

Russia's Ministry of Defense initiated the control over the African Corps, which replaced the Wagner Group, by 2023. It continues to create insecurity in Africa, mainly in the Sahel region. The group is strongly involved in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In these places military governments are in power. The goals of the groups in this involvement is to protect the regimes instead of trying to improve security (Lansing Institute, 2025). This change from Wagner's semi-private structure to a clear state force shows how Moscow has adjusted its strategy while facing global isolation, using the Corps to gain access to resources, build anti-Western partnerships, and expand its influence at a low cost. Instead of bringing stability, its presence has been linked to more violence, human rights abuses, and weak governance, which increases risks for international peace through refugee movements, the spread of extremist groups, and the weakening of global cooperation (ADF Magazine, 2025).

The Wagner Group's rise in Africa paved the way for the Corp's operations. This was founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2014 with Russia's Ukraine incursion. Due to this Wagner evolved from a proxy backed by the Kremlin into a business driven by profit by 2017 when they entered the continent. It allegedly offered security assistance in exchange for mining concessions, mainly gold, diamonds and uranium, and deployed thousands of fighters across more than a dozen countries. Wagner members moved into gold mining areas as they supported the president. Later on they were linked to abuses such as executions and sexual violence. After this a similar pattern appeared in Sudan and Libya, in which the group mixed their business interests in gold with their military involvement for personal privilege. Attempts to fight insurgent groups were disastrous, as in Mali and Mozambique they struggled and in Cabo Delgado in 2019 they got defeated (War on the Rocks, 2025).



Figure 4: Russian officers from the Wagner Group are seen around Central African President Faustin-Archange Touadera in Bangui (CNN, 2025).

Reports on 2022 stated that the organization had profited billions of dollars each year from illegal trade, increasing frustration among communities and indirectly helped extremist groups attack recruits. (BBC, 2024). After Yevgeny Prigotzhin turned against Moscow in June 2023 and died in a plane crash a few months later, the Russian state stepped in and took control over the African operations of the group with the purpose of keeping tighter control (Foreign Policy, 2024).

In November 2023 Russia announced the creation of the Africa Corps on Telegram and presented it as a new structure under senior defense officials to replace Wagner's role on the continent (CNN, 2025).

Russia revealed the Africa Corps in November 2023 through Telegram channels, rebranding Wagner's operations that were under the control of Deputy Defense Minister Yunus Bek Yevkurov and GRU chief Andrei Averyanov (Lansing Institute, 2025). This entity absorbed 70-80% of Wagner's seasoned personnel through units like Redut and Konvoy, recruiting aggressively to reach 20,000 fighters by mid-2025 despite Ukraine war demands (Le Monde, 2023). Unlike Wagner's entrepreneurial autonomy, the Corps emphasizes state contracts for training, logistics, and "anti-neocolonial" operations, aligning with Kremlin goals of sovereignty support and resource access. The full transition materialized in Mali by mid-2025, with partial handovers in CAR and Libya, while new deployment hit Burkina Faso

in January 2024 and Niger in April. Moscow marketed it as a professional upgrade, but experts note continuity in tactics and leadership, now with explicit state backing that eliminates prior "plausible deniability" for war crimes (Politics Today, 2025).

The overall Russian influence through the African Corps enhances these factors, making Moscow a necessary patron in the wake of Western failures. Within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a 2023 agreement between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger that left the ECOWAS, the African Corps are incorporated with national troops, providing drones, weapons through Libyan ports such as Tobruk, and joint battalions announced in December 2025 for "large-scale" anti-jihadist offensives. This is in addition to summits held in Russia, such as the August 2025 defense agreement, which casts the AES as a pro-Russian shield against sanctions and imperialism. Outside the Sahel, Russian influence remains in the Central African Republic, as a regime lifeline, in Libya, with Khalifa Haftar strongpoints targeting Mediterranean expansion, and Sudan with post Bashir resource footholds, facilitating low-cost logistics bases and migration leverage against Europe. This "long game" approach reaps disproportionate rewards: advisors underpin juntas cheaply, expel French and U.S. forces, and challenge UN missions such as Mali's 2023 MINUSMA withdrawal (War on the Rocks, 2025).




Figure 5: Where & How Wagner Group has Engaged in Africa (Statista, 2023).



In the affected nations, the activities highlight destabilization. Mali has about 1,000 Corps members engaged in security and drone training in Bamako, but jihadists from JNIM and IS-Sahel have tripled attacks since their arrival, including blockades in November 2025 (Timbuktu Institute, 2025).

In Burkina Faso, the 300 Corps trainers prevented a 2024 coup attempt but did not halt the insurgents' territorial gains, leaving millions displaced. Niger has over 100 Corps advisors protecting uranium mines while making similar inroads for jihadists. The CAR and Libya experience ongoing violence without any progress in stability, while Sudanese Corps operations fuel the civil war. Attacks are up threefold in Corps' areas of operation, including the 2024 Tinzaouaten ambush that killed dozens of Russians and Malians (ADF Magazine, 2025).

These operations have severe security effects and international ramifications. Corps strategies, with a focus on protecting their elite rather than a people-centric strategy for counterinsurgency, fuel insurgencies, with documented UN atrocities such as executions, rape, and decapitations among refugees, continuing unabated. Resource exploitation leads to a lack of local recruitment, and there has been no Wagner/Corps conflict that has brought stability to the region, extending instability to neighboring countries such as Chad (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2025). Internationally, this undermines the UN's reputation, fuels proxy wars with NATO, and sustains humanitarian crises that displace millions of people, undermining peace architectures by way of economic diversion and terrorism exports (Security Council Report, 2025).

The African Corps sustained Wagner's destabilizing legacy under state protection as of 2026. This allowed jihadist movements to grow stronger but the repercussions are deep and must have urgent multilateral respon

KEY POINTS OF THE DEBATE

- Discuss whether the host-nations of the Africa Corps consent to operate is enough to justify potential cross-border destabilization.
- Whether Russia's direct intervention in African countries is a violation of international law.
- The impact of jihadists groups on the Sahel's population security and development.
- The allegations of human rights violation from Africa Corps members.
- Possible alternative actions from the Security Council to combat insurgent groups in the Sahel.
- The risk of reinforcing military focused governance structures.

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. To what extent is Russia's Africa Corps a geopolitical power strategy rather than international aid?
2. Are the Africa Corps positive or negative for Sub-Saharan Africa's security? What evidence exists? What does your delegation think of this?
3. Can sovereignty from African states justify regional negative effects on security?
4. What changes with Africa Corp's direct link with Russia's government compared to the activities of The Wagner Group within international law?
5. How can the Security Council balance international support for the Sahel with reinforcing the regional institutions?
6. Does Russia's "anti-neocolonialism" flag come from actual interest in African nations rights of self-determination?

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FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

With the purpose of accompanying and advising the delegates in their process of formation for this UN model and this upper school committee, we, as your presidents, have some key recommendations for preparing your portfolios, intervention and overall performance in GLCMUN:

IMPORTANCE OF YOUR PREPARATION PROCESS

As you should know, during the model, it is not allowed to use electronic devices to read during your interventions, therefore it's important to have a conscious research with clarity on the topic and your position, for being able to speak with confidence with just your bullet points.

SPEECH

The way you communicate your ideas to other delegates is sometimes just as important as what you have to say. We highly recommend practicing your oratory and speech-making abilities to ensure that everyone listens.

PORTFOLIO

This is not only a tool to get to know your topic and position, it is an opportunity to prepare your interventions in advance. It is important that you include arguments and possible counter arguments for your position in your research paper.

USE DIPLOMACY

It is important to uphold the spirit of diplomacy that defines the Model United Nations. Debate with passion, but also with respect. Challenge ideas, not individuals. Listen as much as you speak, and recognize that consensus is not weakness, but strength.

MAKE USE OF THE SPACE

When doing an intervention, making use of the space allows you to impact other delegates easier and it makes your arguments stand out more.

Finally, remember to not be afraid to talk to your fellow delegates or to ask anything to us, your presidents, as MUN is based on cooperation and improvement, not perfection.

